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INTRODUCTION

Thirty-five years ago, Felix Frankfurter warned that efforts to
parse the legislative history of a particular civil rights law "started
as an unexamined assumption on the basis of inapplicable citations and has the claim of a dogma solely through reiteration."'
Judicial interpretation of the civil rights statute has fared no better since then. Originally section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871,2 the statute today is codified as title 42, section 1983 of the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School; City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1994-96; J.D., Cornell Law School; B.A., Pomona
College. The author wishes to thank the staff of the William Mitchell Law Review for
their research assistance.
1. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. Section 1983 was designated
"[a]n Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Section
1983 was enacted at a time of violence and racial hatred throughout the South. See
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-75; see also Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights
Litigation and Trends in Section 1983, at 317, 320 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practices
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United States Code. Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for violations of constitutional rights committed "under color of [law] .
Course Handbook Series No. 530, 1995) (stating that section 1983 was "primarily a
reaction to growing terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan"). See generally ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988) (providing
an extensive history on the conditions of post-Civil War America). While Congress
was initially reluctant to interfere with the affairs of the southern states, the Ku
Klux Klan's "campaign of terror" forced Congress to act. See id. at 454. Congress
enacted this provision in reaction to the unwillingness or inability of several states
to thwart the Ku Klux Klan's illegal activities. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418, 426 (1973) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76). These states failed to
enforce the law equally. See FONER, supra,at 454 (referring to the post-war South as
an "organized civil war"). "It was not the unavailability of state remedies but the
failure of certain States to enforce the laws with an equal hand that furnished the
powerful momentum behind this 'force bill."' Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-75; accord
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980) (indicating that a strong motive for the
measure's enactment was grave congressional concern that state courts had proven
deficient in protecting federal rights). Congress sought to protect the civil rights
of African-Americans and their supporters during the Reconstruction period. See
Eric J. Savoy, Heck v. Humphrey: What Should State Prisoners Use When Seeking Damages From State Officials ...Section 1983 orFederalHabeas Corpus?, 22 NEW. ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109, 111 (1996) (discussing the extension of federal
rights to the states). See generally Kevin C. Mulder, The Extension of Comity: FairAssessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1123, 1130 (1986)
(discussing the Supreme Court's use of the comity doctrine to limit federal judicial
authority).
Congress responded to the aforementioned events by enacting section 1983.
Congress intended section 1983 to serve several purposes, including the legislature's desire "to override certain kinds of state laws; to provide a remedy where
state law was inadequate; to provide a federal remedy where a theoretically adequate state remedy was not available; and to provide a remedy in the federal courts
supplementary to any remedy any state might have." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74
(citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 224, App. 268, 345, 365-66 (1871)); see also
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (stating that the purpose of section
1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the states and the people and to
protect the people from unconstitutional action under the color of state law).
The origin of Congress' power to adopt such a provision is vested in section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (citing CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., App. 68, 80, 83-85 (1871)). Congress intended to grant a remedy to
those deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by state officials
who abused their position. Id. at 179-80. In enacting Section 1983, Congress intended to create liability that was tortious in character. See Savoy, supra,at 111-12.
3. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
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The law is commonly invoked to redress constitutional violations
that occur during police stops or arrests. However, 125 years after the law was enacted, the courts still struggle in applying it to
municipalities.
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court's treatment of
section 1983 continues to resemble the reiteration of dogma and
that the absence of careful analysis and a clear standard frustrates
plaintiff and defendant alike in an area of significant public policy. The Article first reviews the legislative history pertaining to
the enactment of section 1983. It then considers the impact of
the seminal Monroe and Monell decisions 5 by examining the Eighth
Circuit's experience with section 1983. The Article concludes by
discussing several legal and practical concerns related to the way
in which the courts treat municipal liability.6

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
A 1979 amendment added the provisions relating to the District of Columbia. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284, 1284. Otherwise,
the language of the statute has remained intact from its introduction and passage
in 1871. See infra Part II (discussing section 1983's legislative history).
4. Reflecting this attention to police conduct, most of the Supreme Court's
major section 1983 decisions on municipal liability have involved law enforcement
confrontations. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989) (police
arrest and detention); City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 258 (1987) (police chase of suspect); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 797 (1986) (per
curiam) (traffic stop); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 471 (1986)
(warrantless entry by deputy sheriffs); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 809 (1985) (police shooting); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 160 (1985)
(police raid and arrest); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 (1983) (traffic stop); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167 (police raid).
5. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling
the Court's holding in Monroe that local governments are wholly immune from suit
under section 1983).
6. Numerous writers have addressed the shortcomings of the Supreme
Court's treatment of municipal liability under section 1983. See, e.g., Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: BalancingFederalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S.CAL. L. REV. 539, 539-614 (1989); Larry Kramer &
Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
1987 Sup. CT. REv. 249, 251-66; Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind:
DeterminingResponsibility in Section 1983 MunicipalLiability Litigation,60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 417, 432-43, 454-74 (1992); Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes A DistortedPicture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517, 52329, 532-66 (1987). It can only be hoped that the reams of paper devoted to the
logical and policy problems with the area, including practical experiences from
lower courts struggling with the standard, will convince the Court that "another
day" has indeed arrived for the issue. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 695 ("[W] e expressly
leave development of this action to another day.").
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CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO PROVIDE A FEDERAL
REMEDY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' FAILURE
TO SAFEGUARD INDIVIDUAL CIVIL RIGHTS

The original legislation targeted individuals who used their
official authority, as well as state and local governmental units that
acted collectively, to deprive citizens of their civil rights. Both the
1871 statute and earlier post-Civil War legislation, which created
criminal remedies for violations of civil rights committed "under
color of law," were aimed at local government officials who were
members of the Ku Klux Klan and vigilante groups. These individuals either refused to enforce laws for the benefit of the recently emancipated blacks or enacted laws designed to perpetuate
the vestiges of slavery.' On March 28, 1871, when the provision
was introduced pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,8 Congress was aware of growing vigilante violence in the South and the
failure of local and state governments to suppress it.9 Thus, the
legislation was enacted to prevent local governments and individuals in local government positions, who operate under express
or implied authority, from depriving citizens of their constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not recognize
the liability of local governments for more than 100 years after
the 1871 statute was enacted. Even today the Court refuses to
hold municipalities directly liable for the actions of their officials
and employees by insisting upon additional layers of proof.

7. See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining
Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 510-17 (1993); Developments in
the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1153-54 (1977);
Note, Municipal Liability under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom," 79
COLUM. L. REv. 304, 310-11 (1979).

8. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
9. See Colbert, supra note 7, at 513; Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at
1154; Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 539. In rejecting the Supreme Court's efforts to
limit the direct liability of municipalities, Professor Gerhardt argues, "[I]t is beyond dispute that Congress intended section 1983 to deter and to punish state[]approved action that violates constitutional rights." Gerhardt, supra note 6, at
582.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S RELUCTANCE TO HOLD
MUNICIPALITIES LIABLE UNDER SECTION

1983

A. Monroe v. Pape
Section 1 of the 1871 legislation was enacted with little debate10 and no question about the statute's use of the term "person" to define who is subject to liability. In Monroe, however, the
Supreme Court held that the term "person" did not include municipalities, even though by that time the term was commonly applied in a legal context to non-natural "persons."'2 The plaintiffs
in Monroe sued the city of Chicago, as well as the individual police
officers who had entered the plaintiffs' home in the early morning, ransacked it, and detained Mr. Monroe for ten hours without
charging him."13
In deciding that the city of Chicago could not be held liable,
the Court failed to analyze the term "person" or any other language in the statute to determine if the context illuminated its
14
scope. Instead, the Court examined a separate provision, which
was introduced at the same time as the 1871 precursor to section
1983, but which Congress ultimately rejected. 15 This provision,
known as the Sherman Amendment, would have made municipalities liable for the actions of any persons - not just municipal
officers - who committed violence against residents of a municipality.16 The Monroe Court concluded that in rejecting the
Sherman Amendment, Congress showed its intent not to hold
municipalities liable at all. " Thus, the Court held that a munici10. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 665.
11. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1192.
12. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191-92.
13. Id. at 169.
14. See id.
15. Id.at 189.
16. The amendment would have required "'the inhabitants of the county, city,
or parish... to pay full compensation"' to a person damaged by any person "'iotously and tumultuously assembled together... if such offense was committed to
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws
of the United States."' Id. at 188 n.38 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., at 663
(1871)).
17. See id. at 191-92. The Court failed to consider whether the statute's language might allow for municipal liability and ducked the issue of whether extending the statute to municipalities was constitutional by characterizing the issue as a
"policy consideration." Id. Justice Frankfurter agreed with the majority's holding
on municipal liability. Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). His dissent focused
on whether the phrase "under color of law" intended to cover conduct that, al-
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pality could not be held liable under the statute.
B. Monell v. Department of Social Services
In 1978, the Supreme Court set out to correct Monroe's erroneous legislative analysis. Far from resolving the issue, however,
Monell v. Department of Social Services compounded the earlier
analytical errors. Consequently, almost as soon as Monell was announced, it became apparent that the decision would only confound the problem of police/citizen relations. 9
Monell overruled Monroe insofar as Monroe did not include
municipalities within section 1983's use of the term "person."
Monell rejected the Court's earlier illogical reliance on the history
of the Sherman Amendment and held that the concept of "dual
sovereignty" does not mean that federal civil rights laws are unenforceable against municipalities.2 ° Of the original provision, the
Court stated, "[A] bsent a clear statement in the legislative history
supporting the conclusion that [section] 1 was not to apply to the
official acts of a municipal corporation - which simply is not present - there is no justification for excluding municipalities from
the 'persons' covered by § 1.,,21
Ironically, the Monell decision rested on the "well understood" proposition, going back even earlier than 1871, that "corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all
purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis." 2 If the decision had ended on that note, almost twenty years of judicial con-

though cloaked with state authority, still violated state law. Id. The only acknowledgment that the statute might be intended to hold municipalities liable for the
actions of their officers comes in Justice Frankfurter's admission that the statute
was designed to reach "official conduct." Id. at 236. That begs the issue of
whether official conduct is, in reality, the action of the municipality rather than
merely that of the individuals who are empowered to act on its behalf.
18. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
19. See generally Kramer & Sykes, supra note 6, at 250 (discussing the confusion
Monell created in the area of municipal liability).
20. Monell, 436 U.S. at 680-81.
21. Id. at 701. Monelts extension of section 1983 to municipalities was consistent with earlier decisions. For example, in 1973, the Supreme Court held that a
municipality could not be held liable under section 1983 for even declaratory or
injunctive relief. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973). However,
by 1976, members of the Court recognized that prior section 1983 decisional law
had allowed non-monetary relief against municipalities. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 385 n.2 (1976) (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
22. Monell, 436 U.S. at 687.
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fusion over municipal liability under section 1983 might have
been avoided.2 3
The issue before the Court in Monell was whether the city of
NewYork could be held liable for damages under section 1983 for
requiring female employees of the city's Department of Social
Services to take maternity leave, typically after the seventh month
of pregnancy. The Court's answer was "yes." However, the Court
went on to hold:
Our analysis of the legislative history [of section 1983]
compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included
among those persons to whom [section] 1983 applies.
Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly
under [section] 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.24
The Court went on to refine its holding on municipal liability:
"[W]e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality
cannot be
held liable under [section] 1983 on a respondeatsuperior
25
theory."
The statute itself does not require a plaintiff to prove that a
municipality has officially adopted and promulgated the offending action. By its own terms, section 1983 provides that a person
can be held liable when acting under color of "any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.
The Monell Court never
stated its basis for requiring official adoption of a "policy statement." It did, however, find the requisite policy statement in the
23. Even in Monell, however, the entire Court was not satisfied that the plain
meaning of "person" extended to political bodies. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist
held out hope that, even though the Dictionary Act provided that "person" may
include "bodies politic and corporate," the Act left open the possibility that specific legislation could restrict use of the term. Id. at 719 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
The dissentingJustice did not point to any such limiting language in section 1983,
but he urged that the possibility of such limitation meant that a limitation should
be implied in the statute at bar. Id. at 719-22. In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,Justice Rehnquist continued to express disenchantment with the numerous possibilities for finding a "policy" under Monell's treatment of municipal liability. 471 U.S.
808, 810, 820-24 (1985).
24. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (emphases added; footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 691.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Monell case itself. New York City admitted that it had a citywide
policy requiring female employees to take
maternity leave, usually
7
after the seventh month of pregnancy.
The decision recognized that municipalities are subject to
suit. The Court held that "local governments, like every other
[section] 1983 person, ... may be sued for constitutional violations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such
a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels.,18 This allowance, however, is at
best superfluous. The common meaning of "custom" includes actions that are not officially adopted.' 9 The words "custom or usage" in the statute can be reasonably read as distinguishing between unofficial practice and those policies that are officially
adopted through "statute, ordinance, [or] regulation." The Monell Court's interpretation of the statute was definitely more limiting than the statutory language itself. Thus, the Court's rewriting
of section 1983 continued.
In 1985, the Court added the further enhancement that a
section 1983 action against a municipality must include proof that
the policy can be traced to a particular municipal policymaker. °
In 1986, the Court opined that the legislative history demonstrates that, while a municipality can be held liable for its own
acts, section 1983 does not hold it responsible for the "conduct of
others" (i.e., its own employees)." By 1989, the Court limited section 1983 municipal liability even further by confining it to those
situations involving "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.""
27. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist deemed the majority's respondeat superior
analysis to be only "advisory," presumably because the holding of municipal liability rested on the determination that the city itself, and not simply municipal employees, had adopted the unconstitutional policy. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 714
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting). IfJustice Rehnquist's characterization of the holding is
correct, case after case construing municipal liability since Monell has adopted dictum as a rule of law.
28. Id. at 690-91.
29. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 449 (2d ed. 1983) (defining "custom" in
the legal context as "[a] usage [that] by long-established, uniform practice and
common consent has taken on the force of law").
30. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985).
31. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986).
32. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The context of the
"deliberate indifference" standard in Canton was a perceived failure to train police
officers. However, the standard has been used by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in post-Canton section 1983 cases not involving adequacy of training. See, e.g.,
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The Fallacy of Monroe and Monell 's Reasoning

As Justice Frankfurter cautioned, the reiteration of the belief
that municipal liability is somehow limited under section 1983 has
created its own dogma.3 The case law simply does not illuminate
the historical, legal, or practical justifications for the shield
granted municipalities against section 1983 liability. This lack of
illumination has moved one scholar to note that the official policy
requirement that the Supreme Court grafted onto section 1983
"lacks the transparency, accessibility, and congruence with its underlying purposes that any legal standard ought to possess. 3 4 The
Court has rejected its original determination that section 1983's

legislative history evinces an intention to exempt municipalities
from the statute. The Court also has rejected the idea that Con-

gress lacks the power to enforce civil rights laws against municipalities. Yet, application of section 1983 to municipalities has
been limited, and the Court has not supplied a rationale for this
narrow view.
Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 E3d 802, 806-07 (8th Cir. 1994) (incarceration without probable cause); White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994)
(injuries caused by prison librarian); Doe v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 645-46
(8th Cir. 1990) (sexual assault by school bus driver). The Eighth Circuit also used
the standard in non-training cases before Canton. See, e.g., Patzner v. Burkett, 779
F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985) (warrantless arrest); Herrara v. Valentine, 653 F.2d
1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981) (kicking of pregnant woman). For a discussion of how
other courts have treated the "deliberate indifference" standard, see Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 600 n.248.
33. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Even in Monell, the Court reminded itself that the generic word "person" in section 1983 should not be given a
"bifurcated application" when a municipality is the defendant. 436 U.S. at 701
n.66 (citing City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973)). The reference was to
the type of relief - i.e., injunctive versus monetary - but the warning should be
heeded for all purposes under section 1983. Thus, a municipal defendant should
not enjoy a level of immunity not granted other defendants and certainly not
found in the statute itself. In Owen v. City of Independence, the Court formulated
this construction of section 1983:
[The] language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any
privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the Act
imposes liability upon "every person" who, under color of state law or custom, "subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States
... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws." And Monell held that these words were intended to encompass municipal corporations as well as natural "persons."
445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980) (footnote omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
34. Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from
Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. LJ. 1753, 1755 (1989) (footnote omitted).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997

9

LAIss.
W1REVIEW
MITCHELL
WILLIAM
William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol. 23,
[1997], Art. 8

[Vol. 23

Without an explicit justification from the Court, preferably
based on the statute itself, lower courts presumably are at sea in
determining municipal liability or in instructing juries as to what
they must find to hold a city liable for its employees' actions. As
judicial variations on the requisite level of negligence demonoutcomes seem mastrate," this cognitive gap "makes the case
36
arbitrary.
and
[,]
unprincipled
nipulable,
In both Monroe and Monell, the Court continued to rejectJustice Douglas' suggestion that Congress intended to limit the statso as to prevent the financial
to municipalities
ute's application
37
•
ruin of local governments. Moreover, it is far from clear that the
truncated standards used by courts since Monell protect municipal
38
financial resources. Even assuming that the Court saw fit to graft
that purpose onto the language of section 1983, it would amount
to 'judicial law-making."39
Another possible explanation for the Court's stubborn reluctance to impose municipal liability under section 1983 may be an
unstated policy assumption about appropriate federal court oversight of local government activities. Yet another explanation may
be an ill-defined legal concept that a municipality only acts as a
collective body, and not through the actions of its agents. As with
the financial liability theory, none of these explanations can be
justified from reading the statute itself or from observing how
municipalities actually function.
35. See Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 600-01.
36. Schuck, supra note 34, at 1755.
37. Monell, 436 U.S. at 644 n.9; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190. Professor Gerhardt
posits that by 1985, at least seven justices were concerned that Monell liability
should be limited to prevent the financial ruin of municipalities. Gerhardt, supra
note 6, at 567 (discussing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819-20
(1985)). Gerhardt presumably grounds this assertion on the fact that a plurality of
four and an additional three concurring justices overturned the jury's verdict of
$1,500,000 for the plaintiff. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 819, 824. However, it is not otherwise clear that the justices in Tuttle intended to use economic theory to reformulate the application of section 1983.
In Tuttle, the Court held that a municipality could not be held liable on the
basis of a single act of excessive force, unless the plaintiff proved the incident resulted from an unconstitutional policy. Id. at 819-20. Like its other section 1983
decisions, the Court did not elucidate the basis for its legal standard. See id. The
decision does not make clear whether the policy requirement is actually based on
a desire to limit financial exposure, or on the Court's belief that, as a matter of law,
a municipality can be liable only for its "own" acts rather than those of its employees. See id. at 819-24.
38. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
39. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 843-44 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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In Monell, the Supreme Court rejected the theory that federal
courts are constitutionally prevented from enforcing civil rights
laws against municipalities. Absent that constitutional justification, some scholars posit that the Court's continuing reluctance
to hold municipalities liable under section 1983 reflects the
Court's lingering federalism concerns,4 1 despite Monel's assertion
to the contrary. In Monell, the Court distinguished between its
holding and the line of cases that protected the states from affirmative duties imposed by the federal government. 42 It concluded that a distinction exists between imposing an affirmative
obligation and "merely imposing civil liability for damages on a
municipality., 43 However, in Monell and its progeny the Court has
balked at requiring a municipality to bear the brunt of the constitutional violations to which the municipality "sub*ects or causes to
be subjected" those who come within its borders.r
Thus, without articulating a legal basis for the limitation, the
Court essentially undermines both the letter and spirit of section
1983. In so doing, it evokes Professor Schuck's warning about
"manipulable, unprincipled, and arbitrary" decisions.4 5 Monell
paid lip service to the legislative history of the precursor statute,
which evinced congressional intent to "give a broad remedy for
violations of federally protected civil rights."4 The Court has reiterated the need for liberal construction to accomplish the purposes of numerous civil rights laws. 4' Nonetheless, it has recognized municipal liability under section 1983 only grudgingly.
This contradiction surely is not lost on plaintiffs or defendants, including individual officers whose conduct is at issue. For
plaintiffs, it requires marshalling proof that may only be within a
municipality's possession - namely, to what extent the municipality had knowledge of constitutionally suspect practices. As case
law demonstrates, it also essentially creates a "one-bite" rule for a
certain class of constitutional violations. Thus, given Monel's
search for a "well-settled" policy, municipalities are not necessarily
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
well as
45.
46.
47.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 680-81.
See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 541 n.10.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 677-83.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 706. By its terms, section 1983 protects citizens of a jurisdiction, as
any "other person within the jurisdiction." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Schuck, supranote 34, at 1755.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 685.
See infra note 54.
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held liable for the first, or even first few, constitutional violations
48
their agents commit in direct contact with the public.
For defendants, the message of section 1983 municipal liability is far from clear. This message is either that municipalities, unlike other defendants, may act with impunity in an area of otherwise well-settled constitutional law, or that municipalities are not
responsible for the actions of the individuals whom they cloak
with actual and implied authority. This latter situation puts the
notion of deterrence in municipal section 1983 cases at great risk.
As long as the burden remains on plaintiffs to show a link between a municipality and its actors, the municipality can maintain
an illusion of distance from its own actors.
The "policy statement" and "promulgation" requirements
imposed by Monell rest on the unfounded presumption that a
municipal defendant can be said to "act" only when it makes formal rules or issues ordinances and regulations. 49 This effectively
immunizes municipalities from liability for most of their daily activities, particularly those involving police interaction with a city's
residents. One commentator has pointed out that Monells standards are especially problematic for law enforcement agencies,
which perform their functions through direct interaction with the
public, with broad autonomy and discretion, and under considerable physical and emotional stress. 50 That kind of "street-level bureaucracy" consists largely of situation-specific, informal actions. 1
Thus, the Supreme Court's insistence on proof of an official policy effectively forecloses section 1983 as a remedy for one of the
common ways in which citizens address constitutional deprivations.
The Court's recognition that a "custom" might be a less formalized government action does little to relax Monelts strictures.
Monell would require even these less formal actions to be "permanent and well-settled." 2 Day-to-day, hour-to-hour police activities
simply do not fit that mold. However, local law enforcement activities are among the very problems that section 1983 was en48. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit
"pattern" cases).
49. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
50. See Schuck, supranote 34, at 1778.
51. See id. For a more detailed discussion about the concept of "street-level
bureaucracy," see generally M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMAS
OFTHE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
52. Monel, 436 U.S. at 691.
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acted to remedy 3 and for which the Supreme Court has expended considerable resources of its own.
IV. LOWER COURTS' STRUGGLE TO FILL THE VOID
OF A SECTION 1983 RATIONALE

Courts often have no idea under what set of facts a municipality can be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of its
police officers. This lack of direction not only creates muddled
precedent, but it places municipalities in a perilous position. It
gives municipalities and their police officers no guidance as to
how to prevent constitutional violations. It also gives no guidance
to citizens, who expect that section 1983 will be enforced in the
same broad way as other civil rights statutes.5 4 The section 1983
cases arising out of the Eighth Circuit after the MonelbthroughCanton line of cases reflect the lack of clarity handed down by the
Supreme Court. The burden of proof in municipal section 1983
cases after Monroe has evolved from proof of an official policy, to
proof that the policy received formal promulgation or sanction,
to proof that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the
unconstitutional actions of its agents. As could probably be expected from so much hair-splitting, some lower courts have
"merged" the various levels of proof to an articulation resembling, "If it happens often enough, it is policy (or is it custom?),
and the failure of the municipality to act in the face of so much
policy constitutes deliberate indifference."
53. See Schuck, supra note 34, at 1753.
54. The Supreme Court itself recognized in Owen v. City of Independence the
"breadth of construction" that section 1983 is to receive. 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980).
Representative Shellabarger, the author and manager of the bill in the House of
Representatives, articulated the reach of the act when he introduced the bill to the
House, stating:
I have a single remark to make in regard to the rule of interpretation of
those provisions of the Constitution under which all the sections of the
bill are framed. This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed.
It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not
the rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your
own Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where
there is wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with
the words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and
constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give
remedies for their wrongs to all the people.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., App. 68 (1871)).
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Eighth Circuit cases reflect this "frequency + inaction" standard. For example, in Herrara v. Valentine, the court of appeals
concluded that the city acted with deliberate indifference because
it did not respond to an investigative report about more than
forty complaints of police sexual misconduct and excessive force
toward American Indians.55 In Harris v. Pagedale, the court determined that the municipality had engaged in a "long-standing
evasion" of complaints about a cited officer's sexual misconduct.
The number of complaints in these cases convinced the court of
appeals that Monell was satisfied: the city had notice of constitutional violations, yet took no action to prevent them.57 However,
the proof of constitutional violations in Herraraand Harris consisted largely of complaints to the defendant city about its police
force; in both cases the Eighth Circuit ducked the issue about the
reliability of such evidence.
Section 1983 cases in the Eighth Circuit have continued to
require proof of notice to the municipality for Monell liability to
exist.59 However, in post-Herraracases, the court of appeals has offered numerous definitions of what constitutes "notice" of constitutional violations. In at least one case, the Eighth Circuit required the plaintiff to show there were prior complaints against

55. 653 E2d 1220, 1225 (8th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff alleged that a police
officer kicked a pregnant woman in the stomach and then ignored her pleas for
medical help, resulting in her demise and the death of her unborn child. Id. at
1222.
56. 821 F.2d 499, 508 (8th Cir. 1987).
57. See id. at 505-06; Herrara,653 E2d at 1224-25. "[A] municipality's continuing failure to remedy known unconstitutional conduct of its police officers is the
type of informal policy or custom that is amenable to suit under section 1983."
Herrara,653 E2d at 1224.
58. See Harris, 821 F.2d at 503; Herrara,653 F2d at 1225. One complainant
did not report her complaint to any city official; however, the court notes that "the
district court instructed the jury to consider evidence of unreported incidents of
police misconduct only as evidence that such prior incidents had occurred and
not as evidence that the city had notice of such prior misconduct." Harris,821 E2d
at 503 n.6. In Herrara,the court of appeals also was satisfied that the jury's apparent confusion as to whether it had found violations of federal or state law did not
make the verdict "inconsistent." 653 F.2d at 1226-27 n.5.
59. See, e.g., Parrish v. Luckie, 963 E2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1992) (rape by police officer); Doe v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 E2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990) (physical
and sexual abuse of handicapped student passengers by bus driver); Williams-El v.
Johnson, 872 E2d 224, 230 (8th Cir. 1989) (prison beating); Harris v. Pagedale,
821 E2d 499, 506-08 (8th Cir. 1987) (assault by police officer); Patzner v. Burkett,
779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985) (excessive force by police officer); Baker v.
McCoy, 739 F.2d 381, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1984) (police beating).
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the specific defendant officer, rather than just notice that other
officers had acted similarly.60 In another case, the court seemed
to require a particular number of complaints against an individ61
In yet another case, the court seemed unsure
ual employee.
62
whether a pattern of prior misconduct must be proven at all.
These different, if not inconsistent, approaches demonstrate how
unworkable the Monell standard still is.
Despite the court of appeals' reliance on a notice concept,
federal district court and state court decisions in the Eighth Circuit are retreating from the notion that a number of prior complaints equals proof, afortiori,of a pattern or policy.63 For example, in Thelma D. v. Board of Education, the court held that the
board's failure to respond to six prior complaints of sexual abuse
against the defendant teacher constituted mere negligence, not
deliberate indifference." In Handle v. City of Little Rock, the court
held that a large number of complaints of police misconduct does
not in and of itself prove a city policy.6' Rather, the plaintiff must
prove that the prior complaints have validity.66 Moreover, in Lynch
v. City of Minneapolis,evidence of excessive force complaints filed
by other67 citizens was deemed insufficient to establish municipal
liability.

60. See, e.g., Patzner, 779 F.2d at 1367 (relying on fact that no similar complaints had been made against defendant officers).
61. See Doe, 901 F.2d at 646 (holding that the defendant municipality was not
liable under section 1983 even though the plaintiff presented evidence showing
that several complaints of similar sexual misconduct had been made to numerous
district officials).
62. In Baker, the court affirmed the directed verdict granted the municipality
and set out a specific standard of proof of similar conduct sufficient to meet the
Herrarastandard: "a pattern of similar incidents in which suspects in police homicides were physically beaten by police officers while in custody at a police station."
Baker, 739 F2d at 385. However, the court recognized that other circuits did not
require proof of a pattern and declared that was "the better position." Id. at 385
n.3.
63. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. According to Professor Gerhardt, numerous lower courts interpreted the official policy standard differently
between 1978 and 1985, because Monell had not defined it and since there was no
such requirement in section 1983 itself. Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 564. Herrarav.
Valentine is one of the cases Gerhardt cites. See id. Cases since Gerhardt's article
demonstrate that the lack of a consistent and workable definition persists. See supra note 59-62 and accompanying text; infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
64. 669 E Supp. 947, 949 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
65. 772 F. Supp. 434, 437 (E.D. Ark. 1991)
66. Id.
67. No. C9-89-218, 1989 WL 98692, at*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1989).
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If the lower federal and state court decisions give municipalities a glimmer of hope from Monell liability, the plaintiffs surely
must react with befuddlement. What constitutes an official policy
is unclear, as is whether that policy can be proven by a certain
number of complaints without official action, or whether the
plaintiff must marshal proof of actual prior misconduct. The
practical and procedural problems associated with this lack of
clarity were voiced almost as soon as Monell was decided. At least
one commentator anticipated as early as 1979 that it would be unfair and impractical to require plaintiffs in section 1983 cases to
show a causal link between the actions of an individual officer and
a municipal policy or custom.6
Case law since then has proven how insurmountable that
burden of proof can be. For example, Herrarav. Valentine relied
on evidence that prior complaints were reported to the municipality; 69 presumably it would have been impracticable, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to prove each of the prior complaints.
In Patzner v. Burkett, however, the court required the plaintiff to
produce proof of the defendant officers' prior misconduct.7 ° This
left open the question whether prior excessive force or mere
complaints of misconductS by
71' any other members of the force
would have been probative. As discussed earlier, to find a pattern of excessive force the Baker court apparently would have required proof that the defendant used excessive force against a detainee charged with exactly the same crime."
Numerous Eighth Circuit cases demonstrate that proof of a
pattern of conduct does not necessarily figure in incidents in
which section 1983 liability is asserted. These cases have often
presented claims that a single act by a police officer resulted in a
constitutional violation. 7 For example, in Fleming v. Greater St.
68. See Project, Suing the Police In FederalCourt, 88YALEL.J. 781, 816-17 (1979).
The writers compare a police misconduct suit under section 1983 to a product liability action, where plaintiffs are not required to prove the existence of a warranty
before the manufacturer is held liable. Id. at 816 n.195.
69. See Herrara,653 F.2d at 1225.
70. 779 E2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985).
71. See id.
72. See Baker, 739 F.2d at 384-85.
73. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, the Court held that a single instance of
unconstitutional conduct may be sufficient for Monell liability, as long as the action
is "properly made by [the local] government's authorized decision makers." 475
U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986). However, as discussed supra and as demonstrated by the
Eighth Circuit cases cited herein, police activity rarely fits that mold.
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Louis Area Major Case Squad, the plaintiff alleged that his arrest
and detention for murder constituted racial discrimination.7 4 Attempting to satisfy the Monell standard, he claimed that his treatment was part of a pattern of discrimination against blacks. 75 The
Eighth Circuit, however, found his allegations vague and conclusory. The court reasoned that the Monell standard prevents an individual plaintiff from receiving relief from an unconstitutional
act unless he is part of a class similarly harmed.76
In Munz v. Parr, the court dismissed an arrestee's section
1983 action against the city and county because his allegation involved only a single set of circumstances.7 7 In Wilson v. City of
North Little Rock, the owner of a roller rink alleged that a roadblock set up by police one evening near his business establishment violated section 1983 and his contractual rights. 7s Testimony established that local police wanted to discourage black patronage at the rink,79 that the commanding officer knew that
"some action was going to be taken" toward the roller rink on the
nights of large black attendance, 8 and that only black motorists
were stopped at the roadblock. 8' Nevertheless, the court of appeals affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the city, because it
was not satisfied that the case amounted to "an instance of unconstitutional city policy." 2
Wilson may be one of the Eighth Circuit's "best" bad examples of the Monell legacy. The decision does not make clear exactly what standard the court wanted to impose. First, the court
held that the plaintiff did not prove the existence of an unconstitutional city policy that caused the roadblock. s If that really is the
message of the case, it revisits the issue that the congressional debates on the original "under color of law" civil statute presumably
resolved .84 The issue is whether the statute applies only to in74.

No. 94-2051EM, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2701, at *3 (8th Cir. Feb. 14,

1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 77 (1995).
75. Id. at *5.
76. Id. at *4.
77.

758 F.2d 1254, 1259 (8th Cir. 1985).

78.
79.
80.

801 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 319.

81. Id.
82. Id.at 324.
83. Id.
84. See Monell 436 U.S. at 669-83 (discussing congressional debate over the
meaning of the phrase, "under color of law").
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stances of unconstitutional laws or policies or to any official act
that works a constitutional deprivation. 5 Yet, in the same discussion, the court searched ' 6for evidence of unconstitutional "behavior" or "illegal conduct.
Second, despite testimony that all levels of the police department shared the same racial animus toward the rink's black
patrons, the court confined the liability exposure to lower level
patrol officers, thereby sheltering the police supervisory personnel and the city itself.87 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the
district court had erroneously used a procedural due process
standard on the plaintiff's claim of racial animus. s The court
therefore remanded the case for determination of the individual
police officers' liability.89 The court stated that "[w] hile the evidence corroborates common knowledge that every police officer
has discretion to act in accord with the given circumstances, it is
insufficient to establish a municipal policy of illegal conduct
amounting to an abuse of power."9 This means that virtually no
actions by individual police officers can be attributed to the city
that employs them. The court recognized the practical circumstance of "street-level bureaucracies" that give almost unfettered
discretion to municipal employees, but refused to hold the municipality liable for the manner in which that discretion is exercised.
Yet another case, Edwards v. Baer, seems like a straightforward
application of Monels official policy requirement, 91 but it is hard
to square with the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton v.
Harris.92 In Edwards, the plaintiff alleged an invalid arrest and
85. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173 (explaining that the original statute was not
merely intended to "override" unconstitutional laws, but also to provide a remedy
where state law does not protect, or is not being used to protect, constitutional
guarantees). If the Wilson court really intended to require the plaintiff to prove
that an unconstitutional policy existed, the effect would be an even more limited
application of section 1983 than the Supreme Court has required.
86. Wilson, 801 F.2d at 324.
87. Id. at 323.
88. Id. at 321-22.
89. Id. at 324.
90. Id.
91. 863 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1988). In Edwards, the court ruled that the defendant municipal body, the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, was not a suable entity and therefore did not address Monell liability of the municipality. Id. at
609. However, it examined the board's policies to determine whether the individual members of the board were liable. Id. at 609.
92. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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false imprisonment." The court held individual members of the
police board were not liable because the board had a policy regarding running checks of outstanding warrants that, had it been
followed, probably would have prevented the arrest. 94 In contrast,
in City of Canton, the Supreme Court held that although the municipality had an explicit written policy that would have required
the police to seek medical treatment for the plaintiff, the city was
nonetheless liable because its officers were not trained in how to
apply the seemingly non-discretionary policy. 95 Between City of
Canton and the Eighth Circuit's Edwards, it is not clear whether
even written policies can insulate a municipality from Monell liability.
V. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
Even apart from the issues concerning statutory interpretation, the courts' treatment of municipal liability under section
1983 raises serious questions about whether Congress' intent can
ever be satisfied in this area. At the time the original "under
color" of law civil remedy was enacted, citizens were looking to
the federal government to restore and preserve rights that the
states or their political subdivisions had either denied or were
ambivalent about granting.96 Still, the continued reluctance of
courts to use the remedy liberally has resulted in major practical
roadblocks for plaintiffs trying to apply the statute against municipalities.
Under current section 1983 law, there is no "burden-shifting"
- i.e., a municipality need not react to evidence put forth by a
plaintiff.97 Case law in other civil rights contexts has recognized
93. Edwards, 863 F.2d at 607.
94. Id. at 608.
95. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 381. The city regulation provided that a jailer at
the city police station
shall, when a prisoner is found to be unconscious or semi-conscious, or
when he or she is unable to explain his or her condition, or who complains of being ill, have such person taken to a hospital for medical
treatment, with permission of his supervisor before admitting the person
to CityJail.
Id. at n.2. After slumping to the floor, the plaintiff could not respond coherently
when asked by police whether she needed medical care; despite the policy, no
such care was sought. Id. at 381.
96. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1142.
97. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799-800 (1986) (per
curiam) (holding that section 1983 requires the plaintiff to prove a constitutional
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the fairness of shifting the burden to the defendant at the point
at which evidence uniquely available to the defendant could rebut
the plaintiff's case. 9s That evidentiary device could save both parties some "fishing expedition" expenses in section 1983 cases,
while putting plaintiffs on a more equal footing in cases that justify presenting evidence to the fact-finder. In many cases, evidence of prior misconduct can be gathered only through such
means as an active community "ombudsman" who compiles evidence of police misconduct" or a civilian complaint body that has
the investigative resources and authority to establish independently the validity of citizen complaints against the police.
The civil discovery process does not solve these difficulties.
Section 1983 plaintiffs presumably may seek access in discovery to
internal disciplinary or complaint files on individual officers. 100
injury regardless of whether the injury was caused by a municipality's custom or
policy).
98. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
99. See, e.g., Herrara,653 F.2d at 1225.
100. A plaintiffs ability to delve into a defendant officer's personnel file is dependent upon the forum state's data privacy laws. A survey of the states that comprise the Eighth Circuit illustrates the diversity in data privacy law found throughout the country. For example, North Dakota is the only state in the Eighth Circuit
to allow a plaintiff unlimited access to a defendant officer's personnel file. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1994) (granting public access to all records of public or
governmental bodies). Other states authorize state agencies to determine what
information will be released to the public. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.021 subd.
3 (West Supp. 1996) (giving public governmental bodies the authorization to close
records otherwise available to the public when they relate to the "[h]iring, firing,
disciplining or promoting of particular employees by a public governmental body
when personal information about the employee is discussed or recorded."). A majority of states, however, allow plaintiffs only limited access to law enforcement personnel files. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105, subd. (b) (10) (Michie 1996)
(providing that certain records will not be available to the public, including
"[p]ersonnel records to the extent that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"); MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 2 (1994)
(authorizing public disclosure of personnel data on current and former state employees, including, but not limited to, salary, pension, fringe benefits, job title,job
description, education and training background, previous work experience, existence and status of any complaints or charges against the employee (regardless of
whether the complaint or charge resulted in disciplinary action), the final disposition of any disciplinary action, the terms of any agreement settling any dispute
arising out of an employment relationship, and honors and awards received); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN, § 84-712.05(7) (Michie 1995) (providing that "[p]ersonal information in records regarding personnel of public bodies other than salaries and routine directory information" may be withheld from the public); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 1-27-1 (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing for the public inspection of state records,
but specifically excepting "[a]ny employment examination or performance appraisal record maintained by the bureau of personnel"; allowing access to salary

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss1/8

20

1997]

Brady: MunicipalLIABILITY
Liability for Police
Experiences in the Eig
MUNICIPAL
FORMisconduct:
POLICEMISCONDUCT

101

For the plaintiff, access alone probably is not adequate; as demonstrated earlier, courts are requiring each plaintiff to prove not
just that a city received a number of misconduct complaints, but
that these complaints had merit. 101 Unless a "smoking gun" sits in
an officer's internal file, most plaintiffs are unlikely to be able to
investigate the complaints sufficiently to prove prior misconduct
occurred.
Wholesale access by plaintiffs to individual police personnel
records poses significant problems of fairness for the police officers and other municipal employees. On the one hand, if the
court accepts the Herraraapproach of the Eighth Circuit, plaintiffs will argue that the mere existence of complaints shows a propensity for constitutional mischief by the officer, and therefore establishes the city's Monell liability. If an internal investigation is
unable to resolve the citizen v. officer complaint when it is made,
the officer will almost certainly be unable to defend his earlier
acts - often years later - in a section 1983 suit.
This rudderless endeavor costs plaintiffs and defendants
alike. With no guidance as to the probative value of prior complaints, section 1983 plaintiffs need to expend litigation resources
to learn if prior complaints exist and then to ascertain if any such
complaints have merit.
Thus, before they even determine
whether a confrontation constitutes a constitutional violation that
would trigger section 1983 liability, 02 plaintiffs face considerable
costs.
The municipality-employee dichotomy that Monell created
also has expensive procedural consequences for defendants. Although it is not clear whether the Supreme Court considers financial liability of municipalities to be a reason for limiting sec-

schedules, staff schedules, and job descriptions of personnel). Iowa is the only
state in the Eighth Circuit that completely forecloses a plaintiff from reviewing a
defendant officer's personnel file. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.7, subd. 11 (1995)
(stating that "[p]ersonal information in confidential personnel records of public
bodies" is not available to the public).
101. See, e.g., Handle, 772 E Supp. at 434; Thelma D., 669 F. Supp at 947.
102. The Supreme Court has justified its Monell restrictions at least in part out
of its concern that not every police/citizen altercation justifies Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484. However, the lack of guidance on
what constitutes municipal liability invites plaintiffs either to assume, absent contrary evidence, that most encounters are constitutionally suspect or to expend
party and court resources simply to determine, rarely to plaintiffs' satisfaction, that
the Court's hypothesis is valid.
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tion 1983's application, 1 3 it would make sense to avoid procedural
skirmishes that increase the cost of litigation. The current state of
the law, however, clearly contradicts common sense. Instead, the
law serves only to prolong what already are expensive suits. Litigation expenses can spiral out of control because the possibility of
Monell liability could cause defendants to want to separate the individual liability phase of the trial from the municipal liability
phase. The result could be a protracted two-phase trial.
If a police department's "dirty laundry" is aired at the trial to
prove numerous instances of prior misconduct for Monell purposes, both municipal and individual defendants could be unfairly prejudiced. If, for example, the allegations against the defendant officer are particularly egregious, a municipal
defendant's defense of its response to misconduct could be
prejudiced. Nevertheless, by either straight tort theory or a balancing of prejudice, the municipality probably should bear the
burden of guilt by association with its own employees. By the
same token, an individual defendant may be prejudiced if the jury
hears the earlier allegations against the department at the same
time as it is deciding whether the particular officer acted improperly. To prevent this circumstance and protect an officer from
evidence of misconduct by other officers, the trial court should
take some preventive steps.
The primary preventive action available to the courts - bifurcation - comes with its own additional costs and time concerns.104
Bifurcation
officer's liability to be tried beforea permits
muicialit'san".individual
.105
fore a municipality's liability.
Thus, if the jury determines that
no constitutional violation occurred, no Monell phase is neces103. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
consideration of financial exposure of municipalities).
104. Bifurcation is not a certainty in every Monell liability case. The trial judge
retains wide discretion on whether to permit bifurcation or not. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a
separatetrial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right
of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
105. See Colbert, supra note 7, at 536 (explaining how bifurcation becomes a
barrier to plaintiffs in section 1983 cases because of the lack of "resources and fortitude" to proceed through a second trial).
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sary.
However, since individual defendants may require separate counsel, they will still presumably incur additional litigation
costs when Monell liability must be litigated.
Another litigation cost caused by the identity split between
a municipality and its employees under Monell arises from the potential conflict of interest between the parties. Section 1983
claims against municipal employees subject them to liability in
their personal and individual capacities.
Thus, the employees
are entitled to counsel in their individual capacities and, where
conflicts arise, counsel separate from that of the municipality that
employs them. Most section 1983 cases should not require divergent defenses.
Monell however, could create such a divergence.
Apart from the issue of defense and indemnification, a municipality could conceivably assert that Monell liability is inappropriate in
a given case, but that the individual officer or employee did
commit a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the city's attorneys would be ethically bound to cease representing the individual officer and a second defendant's counsel would be necessary.
A particular feature of public law, defense and indemnification, also adds to the cost of litigation in such cases. Under Minnesota statute, for example, a municipality is required to defend
and indemnify its officers and employees.
Commentators have
noted that such provisions are common for public employees.1 0
106. Professor Colbert contends that courts that do not allow a Monell issue to
reach the jury after finding a defendant officer did not commit a constitutional
violation are misapplying City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 820 (1986). See
Colbert, supra note 7, at 538-45.
107. Under section 1983, "every person" who commits a violation "shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
108. For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found no conflict in a city's
representation of a police officer in a section 1983 action, because the city conceded that the officer was acting within the scope of his employment. Minneapolis
Police Officers Fed'n v. City of Minneapolis, 488 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992). Presumably, the court construed the city's within-scope determination to
be coterminous with defending the officer's conduct. See id. at 820-21.
109. MINN. STAT. § 466.07 (1996). The state law provides, in pertinent part,
that
a municipality.., shall defend and indemnify any of its officers and employees.., for damages, including punitive damages, claimed or levied
against the officer or employee, provided that the officer or employee:
(1) was acting in the performance of duties of the position; and
(2) was not guilty of malfeasance in office, willful neglect of duty, or bad
faith.
Id.
110. See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 7, at 547 n.258; Project, supra note 68, at 811
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Thus, if a city decides not to defend an officer's conduct in a section 1983 action, or in any other case presenting conflicting defenses, the city nonetheless must provide the employee with counsel."' In such a case, even a municipality that condemns an officer's conduct is obliged to pay the freight. The municipality
would pay for that defense as well as its own defense of the Monell
claim. This is a common outcome in cases of respondeat superior
liability but an inapposite result in post-Monell section 1983 cases
that have declined to follow respondeat superiorprinciples.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Establishing municipal liability under section 1983 has become more elusive than the statute itself or its underlying purpose requires. Indeed, there is ample evidence that this circumlocution of municipal liability is made of whole cloth. While
simply repeating that section 1983 does not make municipalities
vicariously liable, the courts have conjured up theories that might
prove that municipalities themselves have violated policies such as
the written policy in Monell. Decisional law demonstrates that
cases meeting the Monell standard are few and far between. Consequently, courts have chosen not to hold municipalities responsible for the conduct of their employees and officers - people who
have been gut in positions where they can commit constitutional
violations.
Inconsistent court decisions and years of judicial and scholarly debate dramatize the need for realigning judicial treatment
of section 1983. That reconfiguration need not be drastic.
Courts, plaintiffs, and defendants have coped responsibly with
more direct municipal liability and its costs in other civil rights
contexts. 114 It can only be assumed that a stricter application of
& n. 163.
111. See Colbert, supra note 7, at 547 n.258.
112. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
113. Within a year of Monell, at least one commentator urged adoption of a
respondeat superior standard for section 1983 cases against municipalities because
section 1983, like other civil rights legislation, was adopted with tort principles in
mind. See Charles A. Rothfeld, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of
Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 952-70 (1979).
114. For example, municipalities have been directly liable for employment discrimination since 1964, even when their employees made the hiring, promotion,
or other adverse personnel decisions that resulted in the claims of discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(5) (1994). Back-pay awards, particularly in class action
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section 1983 to municipalities could result in legislative action to
cap or otherwise limit each municipality's financial exposure.
As long as the statute is not applied directly to municipalities,
it is unclear whether a greater deterrent effect could be achieved
with broader use. Under the current law, municipalities may have
less incentive to prevent unconstitutional actions by their employees because most damages awards are made against a few recalcitrant officers, rather than against the cities themselves."'
Finally, if municipal defendants are treated like other "persons" subject to liability under the law, the courts could fashion a
spectrum of liability that could distinguish between cases that reflect the bad faith of an employee and those that involve a municipality's conscious decision as a collective decision-making
body to violate the law. Instead, the current practice of sidestepping a municipality's responsibility violates both section 1983 and
public policy.

suits, often amount to substantial monetary liability. See id. Similarly, the injunctive relief available under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act can
force municipalities to expend large sums to remediate unconstitutional conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a) (1994). These situations demonstrate that whatever
the nature of the relief, Congress and the courts have not given municipalities
immunity from large financial obligations that civil rights laws require as remedies.
115. Professor Colbert suggests that the fee-splitting occasioned by Monell can
actually make jury awards palatable, since the municipality itself does not appear
to be squandering the taxpayers' money. Colbert, supra note 7, at 502. It is as
likely that the jury awards against officers do not reflect jurors' sense of the real
value of the constitutional violation, because jurors presumably are unaware that
the employer (the city) is paying the awards in most cases. The actual verdicts may
reflect what is considered likely to deter an individual officer financially, rather
than a sense of public outrage that a government agency has created a set of circumstances that violated a citizen's rights. See, e.g., Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d
1513, 1519-20 (9th Cir. 1994) (approving Eighth Circuit rule whereby juries are
not informed of indemnification and insurance coverage).
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